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Some of our own *faithful* delegation—to whom I have referred several times in my letters—who have done all they could in their secret—assassin-like manner to destroy your prospects and sacrifice you—are overwhelmed with astonishment at this strange result. I shall defer giving you particulars until I can see you in person.

Laughlin has been sick for 2 days and not been able until this afternoon to be in the house.

C— Johnson says “I am a *great General* and that the first war we have I shall command the Malitia of Tennessee *By God*” I decline the honour of the compliment,—but as it comes from so stale and *sedate* an old gentleman and is so much *out* of character with him, I could not help telling you of it.

This morning just before we went into the Ballotting, my movements during the night had been discovered by a few and powerful efforts were made to defeat it by some of your—*now*—would be friends. Oh Governor how much good it did me to see the boys over-reached—outdone and *whipped* into the ranks. Every man in the Convention is *now* your *warm friend*. If you were here you would imagine yourself the most popular man in the world, and you would be sure you *never had an enemy* in the convention. You cannot know how much pains they take to give in to me *their adhesion* to you, and to impress me with the *great merit* of their *conduct*. I am almost ready to conclude that *your success* has made me a *great man*. Every body wants my “*address*”, and desires me to present *them* and their *services* in the proper point of view to *you*. I laid the foundation for last nights work during the day yesterday. I have written to you freely—fully and without the least reserve and desire that *all my letters* shall be considered *confidential*. I desire this as I do not want to create *enemies* about the matter resulting so *gloriously* as it has.

I shall leave here in the morning for Philadelphia and new York and will be at home about 15th. June

Yours

GID. J. PILLOW

*2. Apolinario Mabini on the Failure of the Filipino Revolution*¹

JOSÉ RIZAL was the most notable of the Filipino propagandists for the extension, by Spain herself, of greater political rights to the islands, and the introduction of an era of greater intellectual freedom in general. Though he worked along peaceable lines entirely, aiming primarily ‘at arousing his own people to their social unfitness, and when the final issue came for peace or war in 1896 put himself openly on the side of peace, yet the Spaniards courted their own destruction by destroying him, at the instance of the ecclesias-

¹ For this document, with its introduction and notes, the readers of the REVIEW are indebted to Mr. James A. Le Roy, United States Consul, Durango, Mexico, recently appointed as Consul at Madrid. Ed.

tical reactionaries and because, truly enough, his propaganda had been the most effective in arousing the people. Begun from above, it had reached the masses below in a distorted form; this was the fault of Spanish governmental rigidity, but Rizal paid the penalty for the faults of the system. Apolinario Mabini was one of the younger of the sons of the people who had allied themselves fully in spirit with the reform propaganda. Though he protested his non-sympathy with the Katipunan movement of 1896, he too might have been made to suffer at that time, had it not been for his having borne a minor part in the propaganda that led the way to the rising of the Tagalog masses, and, furthermore, had not his paralysis at that early age led to the extension of executive clemency in his case, after some months of detention. His revolutionary spirit was full-fledged by 1898, and he came out early and openly against Spain, quite as he was later to act as the chief irreconcilable among the opponents to American rule. He was the great Filipino "character" produced by the revolution. He and Rizal stand out as the most conspicuous of what may be called the "Young Filipino Party" in the two distinct phases of the general movement which was, and still is, a Filipino *national* movement. Almost anything Rizal or Mabini could have written would be worthy of careful perusal, as affording an insight into the workings of these two minds, neither typically Filipino in all respects, each possessing an individual interest for us, and yet both reflecting also the aspirations and the undeveloped state of their people as they are in no other way made clear.

Born near together in Luzon (Rizal in 1861, Mabini in 1870), of pure Tagalog parentage, in the heart of the Tagalog country along the Laguna de Bay, and passing through a similar course of instruction in the Jesuit academy and friar university of Manila, their ways thenceforward diverged considerably. Rizal went to Europe, where, after a time spent under Latinic tutelage in Madrid (having taken up a course in medicine), his very instincts seemed to point him to Germany and the northern fountains of learning. Mabini remained in the islands (had never, it is said, left them until his deportation to Guam in 1901) and, on his own account, continued his legal education and his reading in history and philosophy, while a lawyer's clerk, as best he could. Ten years in advance of him, Rizal had been aided in breaking loose from the influence of a scholastic, metaphysical kind of education by coming into full touch with modern science as taught by the research method. With an equally powerful, alert mentality, Mabini was left to grope his own way out from the bonds and constraints of medievalism in thought.

With no practical knowledge of the outside world, living in a land where friars of the most backward sort censored literary output and restricted so far as they could the entrance of books revealing modern views on politics, science, and religion, is it any wonder that Mabini's mind, strong enough of itself to shake off these fetterings, should have been unduly influenced by the first new "school of thought" with which it came into contact? This happened to be the school of French socialism of the eighteenth century.

After being released by the Spanish authority in 1897, Mabini went to his home on the borders of Batangas and Laguna provinces. He seems to have been at least in sympathetic contact with the efforts of various leaders who had not profited by the Biak-na-bató bargain to rearouse revolt against Spain on a larger scale than before in the early months of 1898, before American intervention. Among Mabini's manuscripts is said to be a manifesto to the people outlining the reforms for which a campaign, possibly involving an appeal to force, should be made, dated over a week before the American victory in Manila Bay. Soon after Aguinaldo set up his headquarters at Cavite, Mabini was borne thither on a litter across the intervening country from the lake region, the regions first won from the incompetently organized and led troops of Spain. From that time forward, Mabini was the real inspiration of all Aguinaldo's plans for a future government, writing his decrees, preparing a provisional constitution, conducting a propaganda of reform among the Tagalogs. On military plans and operations, properly speaking, he never exercised, it is probable, very much influence. But, though he remained throughout 1898 merely an unofficial adviser of Aguinaldo, not taking office as head of the cabinet until January, 1899, when the party of conservative Filipinos had severed their connection with the Malolos government, he was the real power, first at Bakoor, then at Malolos, in framing a scheme of independent government, and then in resisting every step toward peaceful conciliation with the United States, provided it threatened in the least degree the full carrying out of the plans into which he had now entered heart and soul. Aguinaldo was plainly not averse to accommodation, on several occasions; but Mabini was, from first to last, inflexible in opposition to the efforts of the party of older and more conservative Filipinos to establish a *modus vivendi* with the Americans. Whoever may be said to have carried on the war, he chiefly made war inevitable, his plans as a civic reformer coinciding perfectly in this respect with those of the "war party" of young Filipinos who held military commands and were eager to

distinguish themselves in a campaign that they believed would bring easy victory over the Americans.

After the scattering from Malolos, the signal defeat of Luna at Kalumpit, and Lawton's easy occupation of San Isidro, the second whilom capital, in April, 1899, a peace party was formed in the revolutionary camp. Aguinaldo acquiescing, Mabini was deposed, and negotiations with the Americans were inaugurated during the following month. Luna, the Filipino military leader of most decision, began a series of arrests designed to coerce all opposition to him and his demand for a continuance of the war. Whether or no these movements pointed to a coming *coup d'état*, endangering the position of Aguinaldo if not his life as well, it is hard to say. Others besides Aguinaldo believed so. Mabini did not, or so he declared to the day of his death; and, whatever may be the truth, Mabini is by all exonerated of any sympathy, much less complicity, with any such plot. The end of it all, in June, 1899, was the assassination of Luna, Aguinaldo assuming openly a dictatorship again, and thenceforward moving on to his final rout and his expulsion from the scene of activities untroubled by a rival of any sort.

Mabini, until his discovery by the American troops who occupied Pangasinan province in November of that year, lived apart from the centre of the "government" at Tarlak; but his advice and influence were often sought, and were always for a continuance of the opposition, while yet he criticized the growing anarchy in the towns under revolutionary authority. He refused to take advantage of the amnesty offered in June, 1900, and the overtures of Generals MacArthur and Bell and of the Taft Commission during that summer and fall only resulted always in assertions of his irreconcilability. Finally, knowing that the project of deporting himself and others to Guam was in the minds of the American military authorities, he courted martyrdom by launching forth in one of the Filipino papers a defiant criticism of the war measures proclaimed by General MacArthur in December, 1900, likewise inciting opposition among the people who hung upon his words against those Filipinos who were co-operating to restore peace to the troubled provinces by means of the formation of the Federal Party. He remained at Guam for nearly two years, refusing for some months to take the oath of allegiance at Guam and accept the freedom and return to the Philippines that was offered to him after the general amnesty was proclaimed in July, 1902. He maintained that he should first be taken to the islands, to see if the conditions and disposition of the people justified his taking the oath. Finally, however, he yielded and swore allegiance on his arrival at Manila

at the beginning of 1903. Mabini, who, like Aguinaldo, was but twenty-eight years of age when the revolutionary decrees of 1898 were promulgated at Cavite, died at Manila of cholera in April, 1903, his frail body (enfeebled by the paralysis of the lower limbs which he had brought upon himself in his early years) not possessing the vigor of his mind nor the tenacity of his will.

The most interesting document that Mabini ever wrote, not excepting the Provisional Constitution which formed the basis of the Constitution finally adopted at Malolos, is a manifesto and new "Ten Commandments", addressed to the masses from Bakoor in July, 1898. Like the Provisional Constitution, this curious document seems never to have been published in the United States. Mabini's commandments (called the "True Decalogue"), designed to replace the "antiquated commandments" taught to the people by their old ecclesiastical masters, inculcate the love for liberty and learning equally with that for the fellow-man; but they also preach to the Filipino masses that their love for their *Filipino* fellow-man should be something altogether superior to their love for humanity in general. Upon this framework of racial fraternity Mabini would build up his patriotic, idealistic structure of a future Filipino society, remodelled by preaching and decrees, quite like the French promulgators of the early days of the Great Revolution. Aside from the political interest of this strange document, one has to note the great egotism and the almost total lack of humor of the young man of twenty-eight who put it forth.¹

At his death, Mabini left in manuscript a work on which he had spent some of his time in Guam and which had received his chief attention during the few months spent prior to his death in Manila. It is entitled "The Filipino Revolution", but still remains unpublished as a whole.² The tenth chapter of the manuscript was, however, printed in *El Comercio*, of Manila, on July 23, 1903. It deserves translation and presentation in the United States not alone

¹ I hope to reproduce the "True Decalogue", in a translation direct from its Tagalog version, and the main features of the Provisional Constitution, showing how the Malolos Constitution was built upon it, in a work reviewing the data of the years 1898 to 1905 in the Philippines.

² It was known to friends of Mabini who never had shared his radical views to the full, and who now desire to avert so far as possible the manifestations of factional feeling and personal jealousies which have always in the past been so disastrous to every Filipino enterprise, that in one chapter of these memoirs as written there was a bitter attack on Aguinaldo. This part of the work, they hoped, could be kept from publication for a time at least, till passions should have died down and the men and measures of the past few years could be judged more soberly in general. But the inveterate agitator Dominador Gomez y Jesus, who had constituted himself, with the consent of Mabini's relatives, a sort of literary executor of the late revolutionist, gave this part of Mabini's memoirs to a Spanish newspaper of Manila, *El Comercio*, to print.

as a Filipino's relation of the events of 1899 in the Philippines, but also in a particular way because it presents, as authoritatively as any but a very few Filipinos could do, the incidents centring about the assassination of Antonio Luna in June, 1899. The cause of Luna's assassination is so much a matter of common notoriety in the Philippines that Governor Taft probably never thought that he might be charged with making insinuations against the character of Aguinaldo when, in testifying before the Senate Committee on the Philippines at Washington in 1902, he implied that Aguinaldo had been responsible for the deed. The publication of this chapter of Mabini's memoirs raised a storm of comment and protest among Filipinos. In the main, they condemned Mabini's criticisms of Aguinaldo on the ground that Mabini himself had been largely responsible for the governmental acts of Aguinaldo, and therefore must share in whatever blame there was; this apart, of course, from the incident of Luna's assassination, as to which event no Filipino of any faction, in all the controversy aroused, presumed even to hint that Mabini's plain inferences as to the cause of Luna's death were unwarranted. As to Aguinaldo's part in it, the most common opinion expressed by Filipinos is that he was unduly influenced by certain enemies of Luna who surrounded him at that time. There is, of course, difference of opinion among Filipinos as to whether or no the removal of Luna was justifiable on moral grounds or advisable from the point of view of the best interests of the revolutionary cause. Roughly speaking, it all comes down to the blunt question, Was it a choice between the slaying of Luna or the death of Aguinaldo himself at Luna's hands? When the lips of some Filipinos who are now preserving strict secrecy are unsealed, we shall know more about this. Mabini's account and comments are as follows:

X. END AND DOWNFALL OF THE REVOLUTION.

As I had foreseen, our improvised militia could not resist the first onslaught of the disciplined troops of the Union. Moreover, it is to be confessed that the Filipino troops posted about Manila were not that night ready for an attack. General Ricarte, who commanded the detachments of the south, and General San Miguel, commander of the east zone of the city, were in Manila on the night referred to.¹ Little

¹ These facts are well established, though it is also true that the Filipinos had been getting ready for a fight around Manila for some time prior to February 4, 1899. General Otis, who had at first implied in his cablegrams to Washington that the outbreak of that night was a premeditated attack by the Filipinos, a few days later cabled that the outpost trouble which brought on warfare between Filipinos and Americans had come prematurely for the Filipino commanders, who were caught unprepared.

accustomed to war, the Filipino officers scarcely comprehended the value of military instruction and discipline; for this reason, the duties of the detachments were kept up in a manner far from regular and strict. The Filipino General Staff had not worked out and established a plan for movements in advance or retreat in case of an outbreak of hostilities; and Señor¹ Aguinaldo, who very little appreciated the advantages of unity in command and in movements, had not made the necessary preparations for a speedy re-establishment of communications between the various fractions of the army, whenever a sudden retreat might give rise to the interruption of the telegraphic line of communication. Señor Aguinaldo desired to retain the immediate command of the forces which surrounded Manila, directing them from his residence in Malolos, although he could not devote himself entirely to the proper fulfilment of the obligations of this charge, on account of his duties as chief of the government and his caprice for despatching by himself many matters that ought to have been handled in the departments of the central administration. Only after the outbreak of hostilities, when telegraphic communication was already interrupted, did he appoint Luna chief of the forces operating around Manila; but then the various fractions of the army had already deserted their old positions, and communication between them was difficult and slow. Moreover, because the Secretary of War had disapproved one of his measures, Luna soon afterward resigned his post, but returned to the command of the defensive operations north of Manila when the Filipino government was obliged to withdraw from Malolos to San Isidro, province of Nueva Écija.² Luna succeeded in reforming our forces in Kalumpit, organizing various companies of soldiers who had served in the former native army under the Spanish government; and around them, as a foundation, he set up a rigid discipline, to combat the demoralization of our troops. But many officers of rank, jealous about their authority, failed to give him the necessary efficacious co-operation.

¹ Note how he is scrupulous always to give Aguinaldo the title of "Señor".

² The Secretary of War was Baldomero Aguinaldo, cousin of Emilio. Emilio, and to a certain extent Baldomero Aguinaldo had made reputations in the guerrilla operations of 1896-1897. Antonio Luna was one of a family of Ilokans who had been educated in Spain and in Paris, his brother Juan having made a reputation in Spain as a painter, while Antonio was a bacteriologist. Under a Liberal administration, he had obtained a post in the Manila city laboratory, but Blanco was compelled to imprison him by the many denunciations against him and Juan in the fall of 1896, charging them with complicity in the Katipunan revolt. They escaped execution only after most abject and humiliating retractions addressed to Blanco's successor and to the Spanish archbishop in Manila, and were sent to Spain, where they were released in 1898. Juan died in Hong-Kong, on his way back to the Philippines. Antonio arrived in the islands in September, 1898, and at once threw himself into the organization of future resistance to the United States. He had read Spanish treatises on military tactics, and merely on the strength of his pretensions in this direction was given a great reputation among the young Filipino war party. Aguinaldo and his cousin seem to have recognized a dangerous rival in him from the very outset.

Hence there resulted, in rapid succession, the subjection to actual military force of some officers who did not recognize his authority, the court-martialing of those who abandoned their posts in front of the enemy, and the disarming of troops who disobeyed orders.¹

However, Luna would have been able to impose and maintain discipline, despite all these difficulties, if Señor Aguinaldo had supported him with all the power and prestige of his authority. But the latter began to be afflicted with jealousy as he saw that the former was making his influence felt, little by little, by his valor, audacity, and military knowledge. All those who were displeased by the conduct of Luna were urging upon Aguinaldo that Luna was conspiring to seize from him the supreme authority. After the taking of the Kalumpit bridge by the American forces, principally on account of the scarcity of ammunition,² Luna came to see me at San Isidro, to beg me to help him convince Señor Aguinaldo that the time had come to adopt guerrilla methods. I promised to do as he wished, but pointed out to him that I had no confidence in the outcome, since my advice received very little attention in connection with military matters, because, not being a soldier but a man of letters, my understanding of military science was of little or no account. I could not keep my promise, because I was not able to see Señor Aguinaldo until some time afterward, when he came for the express purpose of consulting me as to whether or no a change of cabinet was desirable. Not being able to disregard the delicacy [of personal feeling?], even in the midst of these circumstances, I answered in the affirmative, and, after having turned over my office to the Most Excellent Señor Pedro A. Paterno at the beginning of May, 1899, I left

¹ This is a one-sided statement of Luna's efforts to establish discipline among the Filipino forces. He showed animus against officers who owed their position to Aguinaldo's favor, and assumed the full powers of a military dictator at times. Manuel Argüelles, who had been on the first commission to go to Manila and discuss an arrangement for peace with the Americans, ventured to question the advisability of keeping up the fight, in a private conversation with Luna after the rout at Kalumpit, while at the same time expressing his willingness to do his share in the war if the majority of leaders thought it best. For this, Luna imprisoned him without having authority to do so, had him tried for treason, arbitrarily interfering to secure the imposition of a death sentence, and, while he kept him imprisoned for some weeks, sent him weapons several times, with which he was advised to commit suicide. This was the most notable of Luna's acts of aggression in repelling by terrorism the attempts for peace. Argüelles was released by Aguinaldo after Luna's death, and was one of the men instrumental in forming the Federal Party in 1900.

² This was the place where two men of Colonel Funston's Kansas regiment performed their famous feats of swimming the Rio Grande, in the face of some hundreds of Filipinos in intrenchments high on the opposite bank, fastening a rope by which a handful of companions crossed and literally stampeded the Filipinos out of an intrenched position. Luna's personal chagrin was all the greater because he had advertised his position as "impregnable". Yet he had not even taken precautions against being flanked by a crossing of the river below him, so that his men mistook a band of Filipinos marching up to reinforce them for a party of Americans who had crossed the river.

for the town of Rosales, near Bayambang.¹ Some weeks later, Señor Aguinaldo telegraphed to Luna, asking the latter to come to see him in Kabanatúan, to confer with him. But, when Luna arrived in the appointed place, he did not find Aguinaldo in his residence, and he was traitorously assassinated by the soldiers on guard there [at Aguinaldo's house]. Colonel Francisco Roman, who accompanied him, died with him. While Luna was meeting his death by assassination, Señor Aguinaldo was taking upon himself, in Tarlak, the command of the forces which the dead man had organized.² Before his death, Luna had had his offices in Bayambang and had been in Benget reconnoitering to see if the place possessed good natural conditions for defense in case of a retreat; besides that, he was already having sent there the heaviest parts of the machinery to be used for the purpose. Nevertheless, Señor Aguinaldo established himself with his government in Tarlak and devoted his time to political and literary work, an oversight which General Otis improved by disembarking troops in San Fabian, while the cavalry [the column, that is, under Lawton's superior command and Young's immediate leadership], winding around by San José and Umingan, took possession of San Quintín and Tayug, thus cutting off Señor Aguinaldo's line of retreat and delivering a mortal blow to the revolution.³

¹ Paterno and Buencamino were the leaders in the cabinet formed after a meeting of members of the Malolos Congress at San Isidro in the first week of May, 1899, which decided in favor of peace on the terms which the first Philippine Commission had stated at Manila, and declared also that Aguinaldo ought to dismiss Mabini as the chief obstacle to peace. After Luna began making arrests of those favorable to peace, this movement came to naught.

² Aguinaldo's wife and mother, also Felipe Buencamino, are said to have been in the residence at Kabanatúan, in the province of Nueva Ecija, when this tragedy occurred at its doors. Compare the testimony of Felipe Buencamino at Washington in 1902 (*Committee Reports, Hearings, etc., Committee on Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 1901-1903* (Washington, 1903), pp. 233, 234, 254, 314): "It was found that General Luna wanted to effect a coup d'état to supplant Aguinaldo. . . . Then General Aguinaldo decided on the suppression of General Luna, and he collected 4,000 men and went to look for General Luna. . . . General Luna was living in Bayambang, about 75 miles from Cabanatuan, so that it took Aguinaldo four days to arrive at the town of Bayambang. But what I can not explain is the coincidence that upon the same day that Aguinaldo was arriving at the residence of General Luna, General Luna on the same day and at the same hour was also arriving at General Aguinaldo's house. . . . General Luna was killed in the lower part of General Aguinaldo's house by General Aguinaldo's guards. . . . Luna was found with 36 bolo wounds, and more than 40 bullet wounds."

³ This was the "involving campaign" directed by General Otis in October and November, 1899, under MacArthur (proceeding along the railroad against Tarlak), Lawton (operating through Nueva Ecija into Pangasinan), and Wheaton (proceeding by water to the west coast of Pangasinan). Aguinaldo had, as a matter of fact, already directed the dispersion and the beginning of guerrilla warfare when MacArthur reached Tarlak, to find it deserted; Wheaton failed to close up from the sea-coast and connect with Young's heroic troopers; and Lawton broke into an outburst of complete disgust that quite defied the bounds of discipline, when he found that the dilatory direction of movements had let Aguinaldo get through along the west coast of Luzon, to carry insurrection to the north.

I have not believed, nor can I now believe, that Luna was working for the overthrow of Señor Aguinaldo from the lofty position which he occupied; but it is certain that he aspired to be the chief of the cabinet in place of Señor Paterno, with whom he was not in agreement, because the autonomous programme of the latter was an infraction of the fundamental law of the state and as such constituted a punishable offense.¹ This was shown by an announcement which the newspaper *La Independencia*, under the inspiration of Luna, published a few days before his death, saying that the Paterno-Buencamino cabinet was going to be substituted by another of which Luna would be chief and at the same time Secretary of War. When, a few days afterward, he received the telegram from Señor Aguinaldo summoning him to Kabanatúan, Luna may perhaps have thought that the subject of the conference would be the new cabinet. He did not expect that they were planning to assassinate him precisely at the critical moment when the revolution had the greatest need of his strong and intelligent arm. He could not suppose that a legal and proper ambition would inspire fears on the part of Señor Aguinaldo, who had named him general-in-chief of the Filipino army. True, Luna at times allowed himself to say that Señor Aguinaldo was a man of weak character and an incapable leader; but these words were merely the explosions of an ardent spirit, which saw its plans frustrated for lack of the necessary support. His acts all revealed uprightness and patriotism, united to a zeal and an activity which were the utmost that the conditions permitted. If at times he was precipitate and even cruel in his decisions, it was because the army was in a desperate situation, owing to the demoralization of the soldiers and the lack of supplies; only deeds of valorous temerity and of extraordinary energy could prevent its dissolution.

The death of Andrés Bonifacio had plainly revealed the possession by Señor Aguinaldo of an unrestrained ambition for power, and the personal enemies of Luna, by means of skilful intrigues, exploited this weakness to the ruin of the latter.²

¹ The precise question then before the Filipino revolutionary leaders was whether they should retreat from the extreme claims put forth at the time of the formal adoption of the Constitution in January, 1899.

² Andrés Bonifacio was, in large part, the organizer of the Katipunan, and was its leading spirit in Manila and the Tagalog provinces lying around Manila, where it became an effective and really serious secret organization in 1895 and 1896. This Tagalog of slight education, porter in a German warehouse of Manila, who had been carried away by reading of the French Revolution and dreamed that he was to play a part in repeating it on Philippine soil, summed up in himself the popular character of the blunderingly organized revolt of 1896. Emilio Aguinaldo was a local chief of the Katipunan in a small section of the province of Cavite, unknown outside of that section except to the leaders of the movement in Manila, when the premature disclosures in August, 1896, of the Katipunan plot for an uprising later in the year led to spasmodic outbreaks against Spanish authority around the city of Manila and in Cavite and Bulakan provinces. Aguinaldo led a little force which captured a small guard of native

If Señor Aguinaldo, instead of letting Luna be slain, had aided him with all his power, to say that the revolution would have triumphed would be presuming much; but I have not the least doubt that the Americans would have had a higher opinion of the valor and military capacities of the Filipinos. With Luna alive, I am sure that the mortal blow given by General Otis would have been prevented, or at least avoided in time, and the incapacity of Señor Aguinaldo for military command would not have been clearly shown. Moreover, in order to get rid of Luna, Señor Aguinaldo made use of the very soldiers whom Luna had punished for infraction of discipline; Señor Aguinaldo, then, slew discipline, destroying his own army. With the fall of Luna, its staunchest support, the revolution fell; and the ignominy of the fall, recoiling entirely upon Señor Aguinaldo, caused in turn his own moral death, a thousand times more bitter than physical death. So Providence punishes the great.

To sum up: the revolution failed, because it was badly directed; because its director gained his place, not through meritorious, but through opprobrious acts; because, instead of supporting the men of most usefulness to the people, he, jealous of those men, rendered them useless. Believing that the aggrandizement of the people was nothing more than his own personal aggrandizement, he did not rate the merit of men according to their capacity, character, and patriotism, but according to the degree of friendship or kinship that united them with him; and, wishing to have his favorites disposed to sacrifice themselves for him, he showed himself lenient even toward their faults. For his having thus condemned the people, the people abandoned him; and, because the

soldiers, who were led by a Spanish sergeant, but who were themselves ready to desert to the rebellion; this incident, which travelled far in Cavite province and grew as it went, was the original foundation of Aguinaldo's reputation. He speedily became chief among the native leaders in that province. Meanwhile, the conspirators north of Manila, under Bonifacio, were fleeing, surrendering under Blanco's amnesty proclamation, or being captured. Bonifacio made his way into Cavite province, carrying 20,000 pesos of the funds that had been raised. He and Aguinaldo were virtually joint commanders, with separate headquarters, during the early months of 1897, when General Polavieja was making ready for the campaign that was to restore the control of the province to Spanish authority. The rout of the revolutionists on all hands in March, 1897, led to bitter recriminations between the leaders. The most reliable report is that Aguinaldo had Bonifacio seized and tried by one of the summary courts which Bonifacio himself had been employing to remove those hostile to him. Some say that Bonifacio was acquitted by the court, others that he was convicted but publicly pardoned by Aguinaldo as a sign of clemency, being seized again and secretly executed. What is certain is that he disappeared at this time. As to his execution, there is no certain information. Some say that he was shot and thrown over a rock in western Cavite, some that he was made to see that it was best for him to jump over a rock. Again, it is declared that he was condemned by the military court and executed in "legal" form—as legal, that is, as the forms he himself had been employing. Aguinaldo was henceforth the recognized "generalissimo" of the revolution, until the bargain at Biak-na-bató.

people abandoned him, he had to fall, like an idol of wax, melted in the heat of adversity. May we not forget a lesson so terrible, learned at the cost of indescribable sufferings.

The introduction to this manuscript of Mabini's on the revolution is in the form of a "Manifesto" to the Filipinos, which is chiefly interesting on autobiographical grounds.¹ For Americans, however, it is of especial interest to note the reasons which Mabini assigns for reaching the conclusion that the Filipinos have, by a great majority, willed that the war should stop. Among other things, Mabini seems desirous of asserting that he had been more conservative than radical; at least he asserts that he was one of those who in 1896 thought agitation and work along educative lines better than a campaign of revolt. Looking back, then, upon the whole period of Filipino agitation, and particularly to that phase which began with the formation of the "Liga Filipina" among the educated reformers in 1892 and ended with the Katipunan revolt in 1896, Mabini would stamp himself as one preferring to be enrolled under Rizal's banner rather than that of the revolutionists.

In this "manifesto" we have the theorist speculating on theory and practice, saying: "If truth is found in the harmony between reason and experience, so in the harmony between theory and practice is virtue found." "Virtue" has a broader scope of meaning in Spanish than in English, to be sure, but Mabini himself could scarcely have explained just what he meant by this sentence, one of a sort favorite with him. His definition of what religion meant to him is also of interest, especially in connection with his "True Decalogue" of 1898, which has been mentioned above.

We may smile at the dominant note of egotism, the occasional touch of childishness, its author's want of experience, and the lack of a saving grace of humor; but this testament of a young-old man on the brink of the grave is too pathetically serious to be dismissed thus, even merely as an individual human document. Viewed as an expression of Filipino racial sentiment, of a nascent patriotism, the still tenacious assertion of a dawning national consciousness, it touches too intimately upon the underlying bases of a grave problem of state now confronting us of America to permit of its going unheeded into the archives of unread documents. Mabini was not a neurotic, errant Filipino genius, though he occasionally appeared in that light; he was the true spokesman of the "Young Filipino Party", the best of whose aims we must hope to see the Filipinos as a people rise into ability and disposition to carry out.

The involved sentences of the original text have been translated

¹ It was printed in *El Comercio*, Manila, July 29 and 30, 1903.

very literally, not to run into difficulties of another sort than that of extracting logical meanings from some of them. The document follows :

MANIFESTO.

Although from May, 1899, till the following November, when I was captured by the American forces, not only did I not occupy any official position, but I also lived at a distance from the Filipino government; nevertheless, having been treated as one of the defenders of the cause of the people, I believe it part of my duty to give account to my compatriots of my efforts, now that I believe it proper to consider them at an end.

From my capture until my deportation to Guam, I had the honor to confer in great detail with Generals MacArthur and J. F. Bell over the termination of the war and the pacification of the islands. A summary relation of the general results of these conferences will give an idea of my procedure.¹

The said generals began by expressing to me their keen desire that I should aid in the pacification of the islands, since by this means alone would the Filipinos come to attain their own well-being. To which I replied that I ardently wished the same thing, and asked them to point out the manner in which they would appreciate my co-operation. They then told me that they would have confidence in me and would accept my services only after I should have recognized unconditionally American sovereignty in the Philippines, especially if I would then aid them in the establishment of a government which they thought the most efficacious for the happiness of the Filipino people. I again replied that, in so far as I should do what they demanded of me, in the state of mind in which my fellow-countrymen then were, the latter would at once withdraw the confidence which they had in me, and, my influence among the Filipinos being lost, I should be of no use for the purposes of pacification nor for any other useful purpose.²

¹ On May 5, 1900, General Arthur MacArthur succeeded General Otis as commanding general and military governor in the Philippines, and soon after General James Franklin Bell was called in from the command of the district including Pangasinan province to serve as provost-marshal-general of Manila. After the proclamation of amnesty in June, 1900, many efforts were made, especially by Bell, who often visited Mabini in person, to secure the influence of the latter in behalf of peace. Mabini also had an interview with the newly arrived Taft Commission. Mabini was at this time given quite complete freedom of movement and wrote for the Filipino press when he chose. He would not, however, commit himself to acceptance of American sovereignty. His reasons, outlined below, were given at greater length in the correspondence he had with General Bell, which was published in the Filipino press.

² Mabini omits one, perhaps the chief, reason why he and others held off from acceptance of the offers for conciliation made by the McKinley administration both through the military authorities at Manila and through the Civil Commission; this was the hope of such an outcome of the presidential election of November, 1900, as would secure the recognition of Filipino independence and

The generals mentioned saw nothing in my reply but a pretext for continuing in a state which they characterized as one of systematic opposition to the plans of the Americans, declaring to me on this account that they were convinced that my intransigent attitude and that of Señor Aguinaldo were the only obstacles to the wished-for peace, and, as they were determined to secure it, for the welfare of the Filipinos themselves, they might find themselves compelled to remove such obstacles by deporting the intransigents. I stated that, in my judgment, the revolution had been produced not by mere personal ambitions, but by the unsatisfied aspirations of the people; that I was fully convinced that, should Señor Aguinaldo and I work in open disagreement with public opinion, we should become men without prestige and finally incapable of preventing new leaders, sooner or later, taking up the fight to continue it; that true peace was to be brought about only by the confidence which the Americans might learn how to inspire in the Filipinos, and a proceeding as arbitrary as violent was never going to inspire such confidence; that the experience acquired during Spanish domination shows that deportation serves only to arouse hatred and hostile feelings, because it is cruel and unjust to impose the double punishment of imprisonment and banishment for an indefinite period upon persons the charges against whom have not been proved in legal form. And I concluded by saying that, far from opposing the plans of the Americans, I had tried to show sincerely the real sentiments of the Filipinos in general and of the revolutionists in particular, to prevent ignorance on these points developing a policy mistaken and prejudicial to the cause of peace; and that I thought to preserve my prestige at every cost, moved alone by the desire of being useful not only to the Filipinos but also to the Americans. The latter might be mistaken in their estimates, it might be that, in spite of my deportation, and of the capture or surrender of Aguinaldo, minds (*las ideas*) would not be pacified; in such case the aid of the Filipinos who had not lost the confidence of the revolutionists would be indispensable for the realization of peace, and for this purpose I wished to hold myself in reserve, in lack of others who were better, or at least to aid and serve these latter.

Studying now the subsequent events, I do not find any evidence that the deportation to Guam contributed in any way to the capture of Aguinaldo and Lukban or to the surrender of Malvar and other Filipino leaders. On the contrary, there is reason to believe that this mistake had not a little influence in prolonging the war and in causing more shedding of blood. Diplomacy having been despised as a weapon of the weak, the war necessarily ended only when the revolutionists ceased to possess means to continue it.¹ The ordinary and natural course of

also, they believed at the time, the immediate recognition of the late Filipino government itself.

¹ Here again Mabini is not quite candid, or at any rate he omits to state fully the circumstances leading to the quite general laying down of arms in early

things is not that the weak should conquer the strong. We fought under the conviction that our duty and dignity demanded of us the sacrifice of defending, while we could, our liberties, because without them social equality between the dominant caste and the native class would be practically an impossibility, and so we should not succeed in establishing perfect justice between us; but we knew that it would not be long before we should exhaust our scanty resources and that our defeat was inevitable. War became, then, unjustifiable from the moment when the immense majority of the people preferred to submit to the conqueror and many of the revolutionists themselves passed to his ranks, because, not being able to enjoy their natural liberties while the American forces prevented it, and not having the resources for removing this obstacle, they deemed it prudent to yield and to have hope in the promises made in the name of the people of the United States. The surrender of the last opposing bands was followed by a proclamation of amnesty, and on August 24, 1902, the deportees in Guam were told that they might return to their country, provided they should swear to recognize and accept voluntarily the supreme authority of the United States in the Philippines and to maintain sincere fidelity and obedience to the same, without mental reservation or thought of evading this obligation. In order to quiet scruples of conscience, since it did not seem to me reasonable nor proper to give my word without first assuring myself whether I ought or ought not to do it, I asked that they bring me as a prisoner to this capital [Manila], in accordance with the proclamation, which stated that the oath might be taken before any authority in the Philippine archipelago. The governor of Guam promised to communicate my request to the proper authorities, but after saying that he probably would not learn the decision for some months. Nevertheless, I preferred to wait, and on February 9, 1903, the officer of the prison handed me a letter from the governor, notifying me that I was free to go anywhere, except to the Philippines, whither I could not return without taking the oath of obedience and fidelity.

I asked time to consider, for it was not so easy for me to decide as at first it seemed. In the first place, I believe like any other man in certain truths which, after the fashion of a guide or rule, direct my conscience in judging my acts, constituting my religion. That religion

1901. "Diplomacy" and conciliation were employed, particularly by means of the Federal Party, a Filipino peace-organization, and by means of the conciliatory measures for the inauguration of civil government in towns and provinces and the laws of the Civil Commission regarding civil service reform, education, etc. These accompanied a more rigorous military campaign, which undoubtedly played its part; but to ascribe the ensuing peace in a majority of provinces entirely to military sternness and the exhaustion of the people would be very wide of the truth. Mabini does not mention the revolutionary leaders, many of them of more authority and prestige than either Lukban or Malvar, who surrendered both prior to and soon after the capture of Aguinaldo, itself merely a spectacular incident in the general movement toward peace at the time.

teaches me that all authority over the people resides in the people themselves, by the provisions of natural law. Hence it was that, before the idea of the oath recognizing and pledging fidelity to the authority of the United States, I should imagine myself invoking God to sanction an act contrary to the law or order which He Himself set up at the moment of establishing His plan of the world. My conscience told me it was a blasphemy to ask God to aid in a thing which He Himself disapproves. Moreover, if the free expression of thought is one of the privileges of every citizen in the Philippines, would it be legal to require of me to renounce my beliefs from the moment when I promise to lead a peaceful and honorable life? If the practice observed in all civilized nations extends the said liberty to all doctrines that do not promote the disturbance of the social order and the corruption of customs, could an oath be considered valid that was imposed by the executive power against the spirit of American institutions and the right interpretation of the laws governing in the Philippines? Having taken the oath of unconditional fidelity, would it be lawful for me, without being false to the fidelity sworn, afterward to advocate the lessening of that authority, asking for the people the self-government publicly promised to be conferred upon the Filipinos when they shall be fit? If every obligation contrary to natural law is essentially null, is it not more practicable and helpful to try to find some other procedure that will reconcile the respect due to the law and the fulfilment of the proper duties of every state with the liberty of conscience and the promises of the government, in order that the Filipinos may not become accustomed to looking upon perjury as lawful? If at all events the government must use force to punish those who disobey it, is not requiring the oath of a simple citizen the same as confessing that it has not a right to rule without his consent?

It is true that he who attempts to govern only with theory must fail, because the science of government is essentially practical; but it is true also that every practice contrary to theory, or rather to reason and truth, is properly an abuse, that is to say a corrupt practice, since it corrupts society. The success of him who governs always results from practice (*la práctica*) adjusted to the natural and unchangeable order of things and to the special necessities of the locality, which success is obtained by the aid of theoretical knowledge and of experience. It is not, then, theory, but practice confused by evil passions or ignorance, which is the origin of all governmental failures. If the government of the United States has been able to conduct the Union along the road of prosperity and greatness,¹ it is because its practices have not

¹ Here Mabini's conception of government as a thing proceeding from above again exhibits itself. Social reform, in his conception, was a matter of governmental decrees; practical rulership depended entirely upon the rulers. The notion that the United States has given the world the great example of a successful republic, not because of a clever scheme of government and able rulers, but because of the spirit and temper of the people themselves, is something that had never dawned upon him.

departed from the theory contained in the Declarations [*sic*] of Independence nor from the Rights of Man, which are an exposition of the principles of natural law established by the revolutions of science in the field of politics. If truth is found in the harmony between reason and experience, so in the harmony between theory and practice is virtue found.

Nevertheless, after many vacillations and much anxious mental searching, I felt at last the tranquillity produced by a firm conviction. My conscience is satisfied that it was permissible for me to take the oath, because I could not avoid it, for the reason that a necessity more imperious than love for the truth demanded my return to the islands. The more we read the history of humanity, the more we observe that, in the frequent wars which have afflicted the peoples of the earth from times most ancient till the present, if places and cities had always to surrender to the conqueror, reason and justice had to yield also, many times if not always, to the exigencies of force. The conquered peoples submitted to the impositions of the conquerors to save their existence, indispensable for the preservation of mankind, the supreme necessity or law of nature. Now that the Filipino people has submitted to the authority of the United States to avoid ruin, my remaining outside of the islands might be interpreted as opposition to the popular will, as persistence in the continuance of a strife which, because of its unequal conditions, must be ruinous in the extreme. When the people plunged into the war, I felt it my duty to be at its side, aiding it in suffering to the end; now that it feels itself unable to continue striving for its rights, I feel that I ought also to be at its side, to bid it not to despair, but to have greater confidence in itself, in justice, in the future.

In truth, I never had sufficient valor to disturb my countrymen so long as they preferred to live in tranquillity. I was an enthusiastic laborer by the side of Rizal, Marcelo del Pilar, and others who formerly, after having opposed the evils which a discretionary, arbitrary administration imposed upon the Filipinos, asked of the Spanish government that the Philippines be made politically the same as a province of the Spanish peninsula, for the very purpose of preventing that many Filipinos should seek in separation the remedy for these evils, through the organization of such a society as the Katipunan and an uprising like that which occurred in 1896. Knowing the calamities and miseries which always arise from the disturbance of public order, I was not a member of the Katipunan nor did I take part in the uprising. But when, in 1898, I observed everywhere the unrest and indignation produced by the blind obstinacy of the Spanish government and the cruelties with which it repaid the services of those who had shown it the dangers of its bad administration of the Philippines and had offered plans for doing away with these, I saw the popular will clearly manifested and declared it my duty to obey it and take up the revolutionary cause, in order that, destroying only the decaying and the useless of the old régime, it might

establish another and a new régime, more adequate to the real needs of the Filipinos and more adaptable to the changes or reforms which its civilization as it progressed should demand. I went into the struggle, believing that I followed the voice of the people, and I now abandon it for the same reason.

A past of this sort fixes the rule for my future conduct. Instead of plotting new uprisings, I have to seek the methods for preventing them; for such, it seems to me, is the duty in time of peace of every honorable citizen who truly loves his country. The very tenacity with which I have defended in war the rights which natural law confers upon us has been substituted by the conviction that the recognition of these rights by the United States is the surest guaranty of peace and the strongest safeguard against future insurrections. Struggling as long as our strength and reason permitted, we have only succeeded in showing our love for liberty; and, now that the United States has seen fit to grant us this in part, guaranteeing to each citizen the exercise of certain rights which make the social life one less narrowly restricted, it devolves upon us to show that we only wish such rights, that we only desire the free exercise of our activities, to increase the stock of our culture and our welfare through honorable labor, that we may possess the capacity that will justify our claim to the promised recognition of the remaining part. [Literally rendered.]¹

As for the United States, I may say that it will very probably seek to carry out its promises, inasmuch as it knows: (1) that its authority has not been sought by, but imposed upon, the Filipinos; (2) that upon its treatment of them depends the decision whether the present paralyzation of the war shall mean a real peace or simply a longer or shorter truce; (3) that Spain, by prohibiting in the Philippines the formation of associations and political parties in order to prevent their being interpreters of the people's desires, fostered the formation of guerrilla bands, and, by proscribing the Philippine League², justified the Katipunan; (4)

¹ Proof that Mabini was sincere in counselling acceptance of American government (while making a campaign by peaceable methods for the future independence of his people) was afforded during the interval spent in Manila prior to his death, by his letter of advice to the bandit leader San Miguel. See this letter and his subsequent correspondence with Governor Taft on the subject in *Report of Philippine Commission, 1903*, I. 26-29.

² The Liga Filipina, organized by Rizal upon his return to Manila in 1892, but practically suppressed by his deportation to Mindanao almost immediately thereafter. In order to forge a chain of proof of consistent conspiracy against Rizal after the Katipunan outbreak in 1896, the Spanish military prosecutors made out that the Liga had been formed with the express object of working for political independence. This claim was not put forth in 1892, and had not good evidence in its support in 1896. Rizal declared that the object of the league was to "raise the arts", stimulate his people to greater activity in things commercial, industrial, and educational—to prepare the people, in short, for greater political liberty; such broad general aims may, of course, have looked to future political independence of Spain, but that does not make the league an illegal conspiracy to that end, at least under any free government.

that, finally, every colonial régime which does not understand how to adjust itself to the always growing needs of the colonies and their constantly easier and closer communication with civilized peoples fosters the separation of the colonies at the same time with the political corruption and the decadence of the metropolis. If we add to these counsels of reason and teachings of history the pride of a people which knows its own power and greatness and believes that it has the practical understanding of life, we may assert that at present there exists not a single reason to justify confidence on our part, and yet we ought to forget past grievances and sacrifice them in behalf of reconciliation and fraternal union between Americans and Filipinos. Not only has the United States assured us that this union is the surest guaranty of our happiness, but it has by force compelled us to this belief, making itself arbiter of our fate. So be it, then; but in the meantime let us strive that our intelligence and our soul may be worthy of all that is ennobling and honorable in life, waiting till time shall lift the veil of the future to show us the true path of progress and happiness for us.

Fearing that my sickness has been the principal cause of the inefficacy of my labors and incapacitates me for the tasks demanded by the solution of the great problems of the present situation, I return to the obscurity whence, thrust forth by circumstances, I emerged, in order to hide my shame and grief, not for having committed any improper act, but for not having been able to render better service. I am not, indeed, the one called upon to say whether I have done well or ill, have labored intelligently or under error; nevertheless, I do not conclude without saying that I possess no other balm to assuage the bitterness of a painful life except the satisfaction produced by the conviction of not having committed any error voluntarily. May I be able to say the same at the hour of my death!